B. LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEEP GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORY

1. Who will operate the deep geological repository and who will ensure safety - a private company or the state?

According to the provisions of the Atomic Act, the operation of the disposal facility must be ensured by the Radioactive Waste Repositories Authority (SÚRAO), which was established by the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Czech Republic.

Section 133 of the Atomic Act, in paragraphs 1 and 4, clearly defines the anchoring of the SÚRAO in the system of state administration and the scope of activities covered. According to paragraph 1, "The Administration is an organisational unit of the State established by the Ministry of Industry and Trade to provide activities related to the disposal of radioactive waste. The Administration shall carry out activities on the basis of a licence pursuant to this Act." According to paragraph 4(a), the scope of the activities of the Administration is "the preparation, construction, commissioning, operation and closure of radioactive waste disposal facilities", which means that the Administration is responsible for the entire development of the HW.

The licensee, i.e. SÚRAO, is responsible for the safety of the DGR. The licensee may ensure the provision of activities related to the operation of the DGR by suppliers of products or services in accordance with the requirements of Section 30 of Act No. 263/2016 Coll.

2. What is the licensing process? What all is licensed?

Since the DGR will have the status of a nuclear facility, the SUJB permits (the term "licensing" is not known in the Czech legislation) will be required to perform selected activities related to the use of nuclear energy pursuant to Section 9(1) of the Atomic Act. At the same time, the DGR will also be a Category IV site and thus subject to certain authorisations to carry out activities in exposure situations under Section 9(2) of the Atomic Act. Finally, in order to operate the DGR, SÚRAO will have to have a permit for RAW management activities under Section 9(3) of the Atomic Act. The formal procedure for issuing a permit to SÚRAO is governed by the provisions of Act No 500/2004 Coll., Administrative Procedure Code.

Every RAW disposal facility, with the exception of a disposal facility containing only natural ocurring radionuclides, is a nuclear installation (Section 3(2)(e) of the Atomic Act) and thus the provisions of the Atomic Act relating to the authorisations of the Atomic Energy Authority to carry out activities related to the use of nuclear energy also apply to the HLU. Specifically, from the permits under Section 9(1) of the Atomic Act, the future operator of the DGR, the SÚRAO, will apply for permits for the siting (subparagraph (a)), construction (subparagraph (b)), commissioning (subparagraph (e)), operation (subparagraph (f)) and the various stages of decommissioning of the DGR (subparagraph (g)). In the case of planning of changes affecting nuclear safety, technical safety and physical protection, these changes will also be subject to the approval procedure of the SNSC (point (h)).

A nuclear installation is also a Category IV workplace (Article 19(4) of Decree No.422/2016 Coll.) and therefore further authorisations of the SÚJB will relate to the performance of activities in exposure situations, namely the operation of a Category IV workplace (Article 9(2)(a)(1) of Decree No. (b) of the Atomic Act), the various stages of decommissioning of a Category IV site (Section 9(2)(c) of the Atomic Act) and the performance of services relevant to radiation protection (Section 9(2)(h) of the Atomic Act), such as performing personal dosimetry, monitoring the workplace and ensuring continuous surveillance of radiation protection.

The DGR will be a nuclear facility for RAW management, so the next set of SÚJB authorisations will concern authorisations for RAW management activities under Section 9(3) of the Atomic Act, namely RAW management (point (a)) and closure of the RAW disposal facility (point (b)).

Further authorisations of the SÚJB will be required for the handling of nuclear material (Section 9(5)(a) of the Atomic Act) and possibly for the training of selected personnel under (Section 9(6)(a) of the Atomic Act).

According to the 2019 Policy in force, the issuance of a licence for the location of a nuclear facility - a NPP - should take place in 2040 and the construction of a NPP (a nuclear facility and a Category IV site at the same time) in 2050 at the latest. The commissioning of the DGR is not clearly specified in the Policy, but can be assumed to occur around 2060. By this date, the HF commissioning licence and other, related licences covering the areas of exposure situation activities, RAW management and nuclear materials management will have to be issued. The operation of the DGR and thus the issue of the operating licence for the nuclear installation is foreseen in 2065.

However, it should be noted that the operation of the underground laboratory at the planned site of the URL (after 2030) will require a permit from the SÚJB for the handling of ionising radiation sources (Section 9(2)(f) of the Atomic Act), if the laboratory will be used for the storage of recognised sources of ionising radiation.

3. What category of open source site will the disposal facility fall into?

In general, a workplace is categorised according to the radiation activity carried out there. As the DGR will be a nuclear facility, the SUJB will be classified in the highest category, Category IV. This category includes all workplaces with nuclear installations and RAW disposal facilities that are not nuclear installations (see Article 19(4) of Decree No 422/2016 Coll.).

4. What further steps can be expected from the authorities in the coming years after the reduction of the number of candidate sites from nine to four?

Once the selection of sites has been confirmed by the higher authorities, the next step will be, within the selected sites, to determine the exploration area and to carry out work in the mode of geological exploration and research, monitoring of environmental components, water and seismicity, work related to the selection of the optimal location of the surface area. This follow-up phase will be completed with the establishment of a protected area for special intervention works on the final site (response from SÚRAO).

5. Where does the Czech Republic stand in the process of preparing the DGR compared to neighbouring countries such as Germany, Slovakia or Hungary?

In European countries, the Czech Republic currently ranks among the countries with an established and ongoing deep geological repository programme.

Individual countries differ in the degree of preparation of the DGR or the type of host environment considered. The most advanced countries in the preparation of DGR are Finland and Sweden, which, like the Czech Republic, are planning to dispose of SF in solid, impermeable rocks. Another advanced country is France, which is preparing a DGR for the disposal of SNF and RAW from reprocessing of SNF in a clay environment, with the possibility of removing the waste for up to 100 years. Germany is again at the very beginning of its deep disposal programme after an earlier interruption.

The Czech Republic, like Switzerland and Canada, is currently intensively studying potential sites. Other countries, such as Japan or South Korea, are still conducting research in underground laboratories and preparing a strategy for the selection of the DGR site. Slovakia and Hungary are currently preparing a site characterisation process (answer in cooperation with SÚRAO).

6. How do the approaches to DGR differ from or resemble those of Germany, France or Finland?

Foreign approaches to deep disposal are based on the need for safe management of radioactive waste. In this sense, foreign approaches to DGR are not significantly different - no country with a relevant radioactive waste production envisages any solution other than disposal in an DGR facility. 

Of the countries listed, Germany is at the very beginning of development, where they are defining the disposal policy and selecting a generally suitable rock environment. France is preparing its DGR in clay rocks and, compared to the Czech Republic, the disposal policy is also focused on other types of waste (e.g. reprocessed fuel) with the possibility of removal. The Finnish or Swedish policy (rock, clay seals, metal container) is basically identical to the Czech one with the difference in the materials used for the disposal packaging due to the more favourable properties of the groundwater in the Czech Republic at the depth of the DGR (response from SÚRAO).

7. How long will the waste disposed in the disposal facility be subject to institutional oversight? How long will be this supervision guaranteed?

Section 106(d) of the Atomic Energy Act defines "institutional control" as the set of activities that ensure the maintenance and monitoring of the site and the radioactive waste disposal facility itself after the closure of the radioactive waste disposal facility, for the period specified in the documentation for the licensed activity. The length of the institutional control period shall be designed by the operator of each disposal facility based on the results of safety analyses demonstrating the long-term safety of the disposal facility. This proposal shall be assessed by the SÚJB when evaluating the documentation for the closure of the radioactive waste disposal facility pursuant to Article 9(3)(b) of the Atomic Act. The term 'institutional oversight' is not known in atomic legislation and is probably an inaccurate or vernacular term for institutional control.

Under Section 112(1)(a) of the Atomic Energy Act, the liensee for the closure of a radioactive waste disposal facility is obliged to carry out institutional control for the period specified in the conditions of that licence. This period is therefore set authoritatively by the SNCB depending on the conditions of the specific case, which are communicated to it by the applicant for the radioactive waste disposal site closure permit (the SNCB) in the form of a so-called final safety report. The final safety report must contain, inter alia, a timetable for the closure of the radioactive waste disposal facility and the institutional control of the radioactive waste disposal facility.

The active institutional control must be carried out by SÚRAO, which will be the licensee for the closure of the radioactive waste disposal facility, as also required by Section 113(4)(c) of the Atomic Act. Then the licensee for the performance of services significant from the point of view of radiation protection, namely the monitoring of the RAW disposal facility after its closure pursuant to Section 9(2)(h)(3) of the Atomic Act will carry out the institutional control. The costs of institutional control are part of the costs associated with the closure of the disposal facility and must be adequately resourced. Evidence of the financial coverage of the institutional control of the radioactive waste disposal facility must be provided in the final safety report and sufficient financial coverage is therefore a prerequisite for the authorisation of the closure of the radioactive waste disposal facility.

Restriction set up in Section 8(1) of the Atomic Act also supports the institutional control of the disposal facility. According to this restriction activities which, after the closure of the RAW disposal facility, could lead to the breaching of the containment barriers of the RAW disposal facilities and to the contamination of a natural person or an environment with a radioactive substance or to their exposure to ionising radiation are not permitted. The institute in Article 18(4) of Act No 44/1988 Coll., on the protection and exploitation of mineral resources (Mining Act), further supplements this restriction. According to the Mining Act activities which could lead to the breaching of the containment barriers of the disposal areas and to the contamination of persons or environment with radioactive substances cannot be permitted in the protected area for special interventions in the Earth's crust established for the disposal of radioactive waste in underground spaces.

The last element of institutional control is the so-called passive institutional control, which ensures public awareness of the closed radioactive waste disposal facility and prevents its disruption. Following the licence for the closure of a RAW disposal facility, the SUJB initiates, in accordance with Section 22 of Act No 256/2013 Coll., on the Cadastre of Real Estate (Cadastral Act), that a note is made in the relevant property certificates. This note specifies that the owners of the concerned real estate (land) may not carry out activities that could lead to the disruption of the containment barriers of the disposal facility after its closure. Should construction take place on such land, the SÚJB shall issue a binding opinion on the land use decision, in which it shall state whether the proposed project is permissible from the point of view of the interest in ensuring radiation protection or monitoring the radiation situation. The Office shall also lay down the conditions for ensuring radiation protection or monitoring the radiation situation under which the project may be carried out (Section 208(p) of the Atomic Act).

If the licensee cannot exercise institutional control, the Atomic Energy Act explicitly provides for an obligation on the State to provide the necessary activities (Article 107(4) of the Atomic Energy Act).

The above legal instruments provide sufficient guarantees that institutional control will be assured and effective.

8. How will it be ensured that the operation of the deep geological repository will not cause unreasonable technical, economic and social burdens on the surrounding landscape and its inhabitants for present and future generations.

§ Section 108(2) of Act No.263/2016 Coll. declares that "Radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel may be managed only in such a way that no unreasonable technical, economic and social burden is caused to present and future generations." This general requirement is understood in the international context as the need to establish a functional legislative and supervisory infrastructure, to ensure sufficient financial resources for the safe management of RAW and to have a programme for the development of DGR with a clearly defined timetable. All these steps are already implemented in the Czech Republic.

The timeframe for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and ionizing radiation far exceeds the duration of a single human generation, which is about 20-30 years. Thus, it is not possible to prevent future generations from being burdened, in particular by the need to safely manage RAW and SNF generated by the use of nuclear energy and ionising radiation by past generations.

However, the principle set out in Section 108(2) of Act No. 263/2016 Coll. requires that this burden is not disproportionate. A detailed elaboration of this principle can be found in documents of international organisations such as the IAEA, NEA/OECD and the EC and is implemented in practice in three steps:

• the establishment of a legislative framework that sets out the basic requirements and rules for the safe management of RAW and SNF (in the Czech Republic, Act No. 263/2016 Coll. and its implementing regulations) and the provisions of the State Supervision of Nuclear Safety and Peaceful Uses of Ionising Radiation (in the Czech Republic, the SÚJB),
• sufficient financial resources for the safe management of RAW, including its disposal in appropriate types of repositories. The establishment of a nuclear account pursuant to Sections 115 to 117 of Act No. 263/2016 Coll. and a reserve for decommissioning of a NPP or a Category III or IV site ensures that the funds will be collected in the necessary amount and liquidity, will not be used for other purposes and will be easily released when they need to be used, e.g. for the construction of a RAW disposal facility. This ensures that in the future the costs of RAW disposal will not place an undue economic burden on future generations.
• an established programme for the development of repositories for all types of RAW, which in the case of the Czech Republic means, among other things, the development of DGR, which is under the responsibility of SÚRAO. SÚRAO, established by the Ministry of Industry and Trade, is an organisational unit of the State which, among other things, ensures the preparation, construction, commissioning and subsequent operation and closure of all RAW disposal sites, including the planned DGR (see Section 113(4)(a) of Act No. 263/2016 Coll.). This infrastructure will ensure continuity in the development of the DGR and will leave to future generations a functional system for the development and subsequent operation of the DGR. This will help to minimise the technical burden on future generations in particular.